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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to review what is known about the technologies that internet 
child sex offenders use to abuse or to exploit children, offenders’ attitudes towards online 
security and surveillance risk, and their use of identity protection tactics and technologies. 
The peer-reviewed literature on internet sex offenders published between 2000 and 2011 was 
surveyed. Internet child sex offenders use a mixture of new and old technologies to abuse 
children. Offenders’ awareness of internet-related risk appears to exist along a continuum. A 
number of psychological and demographic factors may influence offenders’ perceptions of 
online security risk and their willingness to take security precautions. A surprisingly large 
number of apprehended offenders in the time period examined by this review did not seem to 
use any technologies to disguise their identities. A major research programme into internet 
offenders’ use of identity protection technologies, and their use of technologies in general, is 
needed. 
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Key practitioner messages 
·   Internet child sex offenders use a variety of commonly available technologies, such 
as social networking sites and peer-to-peer platforms, to abuse children. 
·   Offenders are a diverse group when it comes to how they perceive risk and act on 
those perceptions. The risk perceptions and risk management behaviours of individual 
offenders can be dynamic. 
·   In the period surveyed by this review (2000-2011) some studies found that 
surprisingly few offenders used technological measures to protect their identities. 
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Introduction 
The internet is a significant resource for child sex offenders. Some offenders use the internet 
to facilitate non-contact offences, such as downloading child pornography; others for 
grooming children; and still others use it to network with likeminded individuals (Beech et 
al., 2008; Doring, 2000; Elliott & Beech, 2009; Gallagher, 2007; Schell et al. 2007). The 
internet also provides offenders with a degree of anonymity that they can use – or at least feel 
that they can use - to avoid detection or thwart investigation. However although the internet 
has significant advantages for offenders, it can render some of them more vulnerable to being 
traced than if they abused off-line (Wolak et al., 2011).  
 
To date, there has been a significant amount of research done on the intrapersonal 
characteristics of internet sex offenders, (the ‘sex offender’ component of ‘internet sex 
offenders’) (Nielssen et al., 2011), but researchers, such as Dombrowki & Gischlar (2007) 
and Prichard et al. (2011), have noted that there is little research  on the ‘internet’ component. 
There is a particular lack of research on the strategies that offenders use to evade detection by  
law enforcement agencies (Holt et al., 2010). To help to begin to address this gap, the authors 
conducted a review of the peer-reviewed literature on internet child sex offending (published 
between 2000 and 2011) to examine what is known about these individuals attitudes towards 
online security and their use of identity protection techniques and technologies. The review 
sought to answer the following questions: What internet technologies do child sex offenders 
use to abuse or exploit children? How conscious are internet sex offenders of the need to 
protect their identities when they engage in online abuse activities? And what technologies 
and tactics do offenders use to manage the risk of surveillance?  
 
There is an increasing number of organisations involved in responding to the threat of 
internet child sexual abuse (ICSA). Law enforcement agencies have been at the forefront of 
this response. These agencies have subsequently been joined by groups concerned with a). 
offender treatment, b). the provision of internet services and c). agencies involved in the 
support of children and families. National governments also play a key role in this response, 
especially in terms of enacting legislation to criminalise particular behaviours or to permit 
law enforcement monitoring of internet use. There an increasing pressure upon some of these 
organisations, in particular those providing internet services, to establish a more effective 
response to ICSA. All of these organisations need to be aware of the way in which child sex 
offenders use the internet, if they are to address this problem. This, however, is a challenge, 
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given the minimal amount of research in this area. It is, in light of this fact, essential that full 
use is made of those data that do exist. It is the aim of this review to highlight the key 
messages from the research to date in order that all of those concerned with child protection 
on the internet are more informed  as to the manner in which offenders use the internet to 
bring about CSA. 
 
The raison d’etre of this review is then, in essence, to facilitate evidence-based practice. This 
is of most immediate relevance to law enforcement, others involved in the criminal justice 
system (such as prosecutors and probation staff), along with those charged with treating 
internet child sex offenders. This review draws together what is known about the technology 
that offenders use to perpetrate their crimes, the specific purposes to which they put these 
technologies and the ways in which they use this technology to manage risk. Possession of 
this information will enable these agency workers to have an enhanced understanding of both 
the character and behaviour of offenders. Armed with this knowledge, agency workers should 
be better equipped to tackle the challenges that offenders present.  
 
 
Method 
The authors searched Pubmed, Web of Science, Psychinfo and Inspec using combinations of 
the terms: child pornography, indecent image, sex offender (refined with the addition of 
keywords: internet, technology, encryption, peer-to-peer), grooming (refined with the 
addition of keywords: internet, sexual abuse), sexual abuse (refined with the addition of 
keywords: internet, technology, encryption, peer-to-peer). 689 peer-reviewed articles were 
identified through this initial key-word database, of which 43 were included in the final 
review.  
 
To be included, articles either had to address the topic of internet sex offenders’ technology 
usage, or the subject of sex offenders and identity and anonymity on the internet. The key 
reasons for excluding articles were: a). their subject matter was unrelated to the topics of 
interest to this review; b). they focused solely on offenders’ non-technological characteristics; 
c). they focused on technologies that offenders could potentially use, but did not discuss how 
sex offenders either used or understood these technologies d). they were review or editorial 
articles that did not provide additional information beyond what could be obtained from 
original research articles. The authors included only peer-reviewed articles that were written 
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in English and were published between 2000 and 2011. Time and resource constraints meant 
that we were unable to undertake a systematic search of government or police reports on this 
topic; however we have included two reports from 2012 that provide additional insights and 
background information about the problem.  
 
What internet technologies do child sex offenders use to abuse or exploit children? 
Offenders use a variety of common technologies to exploit or abuse children, including 
email, instant messaging, web cams, bulletin boards and 3G phones (Beech et al., 2008; 
Gallagher, 2007; Mitchell et al. 2011). A number of offenders continue to use technologies 
that the general public has largely moved away from, such as newsgroups and chatrooms 
(Mitchell et al., 2010a; O’ Halloran & Quayle, 2010). Peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharing seem to 
be commonly employed by child pornographers, particularly by younger offenders 
(Kiergergaard, 2011; Latapy et al., 2011; Sheehan & Sullivan, 2010; Steel, 2009; Stola et al., 
2009; Wolak et al. 2011). In fact, some researchers have argued that the vast majority of 
paedophile activity on the internet now occurs on P2P platforms (Kierkergaard, 2011). 
Recent studies also suggest that offenders are increasingly using social network sites to 
engage in child abuse activities, especially for grooming related offences (Mitchell et al. 
2010a; Qualyle & Taylor, 2011). It is unclear why offenders value and use particular 
technologies; however theoretical research on how people learn about technology suggests 
that familiarity with the technology, the technology’s ease of use and its perceived usefulness 
for offenders’ goals may be important factors (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000).  
 
Offenders value the internet for its accessibility, affordability and, perhaps most importantly 
of all, anonymity (Beech et al., 2008; Dombrowski et al., 2007; Graham, 2000; Harrisson, 
2006; Mitchell et al., 2005a). The internet should, however, be regarded as more of a 
pseudoanonymizing technology rather than a fully anonymizing one. Many individuals on the 
internet can be traced if the tracer has the time and resources to do so (Latapy et al., 2011). 
For example, I.P. (internet protocol) addresses (identifiers assigned to each device in a 
computer network) can be automatically logged by programs, websites or peers in peer-to-
peer filesharing networks, which can lead the police to an offender’s location (Liberatore et 
al., 2010; Wolak et al., 2011a). The police in some countries frequently use the internet’s 
anonymity to run online ‘sting’ operations, creating false sexually suggestive personas that 
will attract offenders (Briggs et al. 2011; Mitchell et al., 2010b; Urbas, 2010). The truth is 
that offenders’ identities can be discovered on the internet and the web is potentially a risky 
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environment for them (Bourke & Hernandez, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2010a; Mitchell et al., 
2011). Eneman (2009), drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, argues that the internet is a 
panoptican environment for child sex offenders, that is an electronic landscape where they 
are under constant risk of surveillance.  
 
 
How concerned are internet sex offenders about the risks of being detected while engaging in 
online abuse activities? 
Foucault’s work would suggest that given this panoptican context, offenders would become 
highly concerned about the risk and avoid engaging in behaviours that might facilitate 
detection by law enforcement. However, the empirical research indicates that offenders’ 
awareness of internet-related risk exists along a continuum. Some offenders, such as 
individuals who are engaged in contact offences and those who are embedded within internet 
paedophile networks, are aware of risk and feel that they are- or at least could be- under 
surveillance from law enforcement agencies (D’ Ovidio et al., 2009; Eneman, 2009; Holt et 
al., 2010; Ray et al., 2010; Sheehan & Sullivan, 2010). Conversely, other researchers have 
noted that a proportion of internet sex offenders appear to be relatively insensitive to 
detection risk (Beech et al., 2008, Briggs et al. 2011; Glasgow, 2010). Indeed, even offenders 
who are concerned about detection risk can display variable risk awareness, or a variable 
inclination to act on their risk perceptions (Eneman, 2009).  
 
Factors that influence sex offenders’ online perceptions of risk 
A number of studies have identified factors that could underlie and modify offenders’ 
perceptions of internet-related risk.  
 
Demographic factors: Age might be one risk-related variable, with some studies finding that 
some young people are “immature” and “foolhardy” (Zhang, 2010) in relation to assessing 
the risks stemming from creation and distribution of (often self-generated) indecent images 
(Kierkergaard, 2011; Quayle & Taylor, 2011). Wolak et al. (2008) note that offenders with 
higher education levels and higher social statuses are sometimes less concerned about 
detection risk than offenders with less education and who are from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds, often because they lack criminal experience and suspicion of law 
enforcement (Wolak et al., 2008).  
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Psychological factors: Offenders who have problems with emotional dysregulation have been 
found to act spontaneously and often without regard to future consequences when using the 
internet (Elliott & Beech, 2009). Internet generated feelings of deindividuation can influence 
risk-taking perceptions amongst internet sex offenders (Prichard et al., 2011). Individuals 
who access child pornography, or interact with children, in a sexually aroused state may 
minimise the perceived risk of detection (Prichard et al., 2011). Some offenders appear to 
have an optimistic bias (Eneman, 2009), feeling that while offenders in general are likely to 
be detected, they in particular are not. A significant proportion of chat-room offenders have 
mental health and substance abuse problems; it seems plausible that individuals with these 
issues would have problems assessing risk in certain circumstances, or that their risk 
perceptions could vary according to their mood or substance use (Briggs et al., 2011). 
 
Social factors: Being a member of a paedophile forum or network where security concerns 
are regularly identified and shared can encourage risk awareness amongst some offenders 
(Eneman, 2009; Holt et al., 2010), as can high-profile media coverage of police raids on 
offender networks (Holt et al., 2010).  
 
Technological knowledge: Offenders with specialised knowledge of internet technologies and 
computer science may have a greater appreciation of computer-related risk than offenders 
without this knowledge (Eneman, 2009). What technologies and tactics do offenders use to 
manage the risk of detection when engaging in child abuse activities? Offenders can use a 
variety of different strategies to manage the risk of detection.   
 
Identity protection technologies 
A number of offenders use encryption technologies to protect their identities. Armstrong and 
Forde (2003) note that “paedophiles are obviously skilled in the use of encryption...as well as 
the practice of internet anonymity”. Kierkergaard (2011) observed that some paedophile 
forums on the internet are “heavily encrypted” and Seto et al. 2010 found that 80% of a small 
sample of offenders (n=20) attempted to hide child pornography content through the use of 
encryption. Offenders in Eneman’s (2010a) qualitative study used a variety of technologies- 
particularly proxy servers- to remain anonymous when downloading child pornography 
content. Some offenders involved in grooming children use VPNs (virtual private networks) 
located in other countries to hide their internet traffic (Webster et al., 2012).  
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In contrast to these findings, however, the largest peer-reviewed study of detected child 
pornography offenders’ identity protection technology usage (Wolak et. al., 2011) found that 
only 3% of 604 detected offender cases used encryption (it is unclear whether this figure 
refers to hard-disk or network traffic encryption), and that the proportion of offenders who 
used encryption appeared to have declined between 2000 and 2006 (the most recent time 
period looked at by the study). In fact, Wolak et al. found that only 19% of their sample used 
any technical means- including passwords- to hide their child abuse activities. Why more 
individuals in Wolak’s study did not take more steps to protect their identities is an 
interesting question. It may be that encryption and other security and anonymization 
technologies are used by only a proportion of technologically proficient offenders, and that 
most individuals who access child abuse content do not know how to use it, or think that the 
‘anonymity’ of the internet is sufficient to guarantee their safety. These individuals may think 
that their risk of being detected is small. Deindividuation caused by internet use may 
encourage impulsive and disinhibited behaviour in some child pornography offenders 
(Prichard et al., 2011), and the use of identity protection technologies may be less likely 
when individuals are in this state. Webster et al. (2012) were involved in a study of internet 
groomers where they found that the offenders who were least likely to use identity protection 
measures were hypersexual men who were almost completely behaviourally unregulated and 
unconcerned about risk; and naive ‘intimacy seekers’ who felt that they had nothing to hide 
or be ashamed of about their behaviour. These latter individuals did not employ identity 
protection technologies because they felt that the use of these technologies would signify that 
they were doing something ‘wrong’. For these individuals, not taking steps to protect their 
identities from discovery appeared to be an identity-preserving measure, one that enabled 
them to interact with children without experiencing cognitive dissonance. Even offenders 
who do use identity protection technologies sometimes do so ineffectively, for example 
attempting to format a hard-disk but leaving substantial child abuse material on it (Wardwell 
& Smith, 2008).    
 
Disposable technologies 
Some offenders use dedicated computers and smartphones, separate from their regular 
computers or phones, to access child abuse content (Holt et al., 2010). This means that if the 
offender feels that he has come to the attention of the police he can quickly dispose of the 
technology without becoming significantly inconvenienced (Holt et al., 2010; Webster et al., 
2012). 
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Pseudonyms 
Individuals involved in child pornography or grooming offences can establish fake identities, 
for example employing pseudonymns in chatrooms or on forums/social network sites, or 
sometimes even pretending to be children themselves (Graham, 2000; Holt et al., 2010; 
Webster et al., 2012). A paedophile forum member in Holt et al’s. (2010) study advised other 
forumites “don’t put any real personal stuff in your online profile”. Despite this, offenders 
sometimes reveal a surprising amount of real-life information in their internet ‘handles’ such 
as details about their real-life names, initials, occupations and birthdates (Briggs et al., 2011).  
 
Private communication and distribution channels 
Offenders can seek to control risk by establish private communication and distribution 
channels between themselves. These may be (although they are not limited to) private, 
restricted chat-rooms or private peer-to-peer trackers (Kierkergaard, 2011) that are not 
publicly advertised; information about these channels is passed on only to trusted others. 
Private communication channels can also be established behind more public (sometimes 
legal) websites, including social network sites; for example offenders can join mainstream 
social network sites and then use the private message functions of those sites to communicate 
with one another about child abuse related matters (Mitchell et al., 2010a).  
 
Avoiding high-risk environments 
Offenders can manage danger by avoiding what they consider to be high risk macro- or 
micro- internet environments. On the macro-scale, offenders often host child abuse material 
on servers that are located in developing counties in order to take advantage of those 
countries lax laws around the possession and distribution of child pornography (Kierkergaard, 
2011; Steel, 2009). On the micro-scale, Mitchell et al. (2005b) argue that undetected 
offenders might avoid child abuse websites, or sexual chat rooms, because they know that 
these sites are the most likely to be patrolled by the police. These offenders may instead focus 
on accessing images of children, or making contact with children, via non-sexual sites or chat 
rooms. Offenders can also avoid websites and individuals who they feel could fall under the 
jurisdiction of their national police force: a UK based child pornographer in Sheehan and 
Sullivan (2010) study noted “the whole time I had been online I had purposely avoided 
people from the UK because I was scared of police basically”. Offenders can access child 
abuse content from anonymous venues such as internet cafes; this means that if the I.P. 
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address of the venue is traced then the trail will not lead back to them personally. However, it 
is unclear whether a significant number of offenders engage in these kinds of evasive tactics; 
77% of offenders in Wolak et al.s (2011) study accessed child pornography from their home 
computer, and another 3% from their work computers. 
 
Offender groups 
Some internet offenders who are actively involved in child abuse activities develop structured 
networks with likeminded others (Beech et al., 2008). These groups use many of the security 
tactics noted to this point (Elliott & Beech, 2009; Stola et al., 2009). Groups are somewhat 
different from individuals, however, in that they sometimes establish formal, sophisticated 
security policies, though some groups may be lax about doing so (Briggs et al., 2011; 
D’Ovidio et al., 2009; Eneman, 2009; Eneman, 2010a; Graham, 2000; Holt et al., 2010; 
Kierkergaard, 2011; Lambert & O’ Halloran, 2008; Schell et al., 2007). Graham (2000) 
highlighted the security protocols that were used by members of the paedophile website, the 
Wonderland Club, which forced all new members to a). provide 10,000 unique images of 
child pornography b). be sponsored by existing members of the group and c). be subject to a 
formal credibility review by a membership committee. Some groups will also force members 
to use technologies that the group administrators consider to be secure (Eneman, 2009).  
 
While the strategies employed by groups such as Wonderland (for example, forced sharing of 
images) help to maintain network security, they are also potentially risky for the individuals 
wishing to join those groups. The person who is supplying child abuse material cannot know 
for sure if the people with whom they are interacting are other offenders or the police. They 
also cannot know what other offenders will do with any uploaded child abuse material. As a 
result, some offenders refuse to share their images (Sheehan & Sullivan, 2010). Others do 
take this risk, either because they perceive that they can gain status within the group or 
because they feel that the rewards of sharing images (for instance, access to other offenders’ 
images) are greater than the risks of doing so (Gallagher, 2007).  
 
Offenders often reveal risky personal information once they have joined a group and begun to 
interact with other group members, often despite the exhortations of group administrators 
(Gallagher, 2007, Eneman, 2009). When joining a paedophile network an offender enters a 
social environment where they can obtain positive feedback, positive reciprocity and 
emotional congruence, perhaps for the first time in his life (Holt et al., 2010). Research on 
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non-internet sex offenders suggests that the longer an offender spends interacting with these 
kind of online ‘support’ networks the greater his likelihood will be of disclosing information 
about himself (Whitty, 2002). Offenders can also inadvertently reveal clues to their real-life 
locations simply by the way that they spell certain words when communicating with other 
group members (Eneman, 2009). Offenders’ tendency to ‘leak’ personal information may be 
counter-balanced to an extent by the fact that group members often monitor each others’ 
behaviour to ensure that they are being sufficiently secure (Eneman, 2009).  
 
Paedophile web-forums 
Some offenders join paedophile discussion groups or forums where they can discuss their 
sexual interest in children. These sites usually do not require members to reveal any personal 
information about themselves. Site administrators often emphasize to members the need to 
avoid engaging in any activity on the forum that would draw the attention of law enforcement 
(D’ Ovidio et al., 2009). When group members post links that could be considered legally 
risky, such as to images or videos of children, administrators often require that multiple proxy 
links be supplied below each link (Holt et al., 2010). Some individuals who discuss possible 
child abuse activities on these forums frame their activities as ‘dreams’ that they once had 
(Holt et al., 2010). Therefore they are not stating that they actually engaged in any illegal 
activity. As with active offender groups, members of paedophile discussion forums often 
monitor each others behaviour. When a forum member in Holt et al.’s (2010) study informed 
the group that he was thinking of meeting a boy who he had met over the internet, another 
forum member noted that the person was getting himself into a very high risk situation: 
“Man, this is dangerous, dangerous, dangerous territory. I hate to burst your bubble, but you 
should realize that the probability is VERY high that you’re talking to the police”. 
 
Individuals who abuse children for commercial profit 
Some researchers have argued that sex offenders will not pay to access child abuse images 
because of concerns about security risks (i.e. their credit card information will be seized by 
the police) (D’ Ovidio et al. 2009; Sheehan & Sullivan, 2010), though it may be that research 
has not kept up with practice here. Some offenders appear to have stopped paying for child 
abuse content with traceable currencies, and have instead switched to using anonymous 
payment systems (Nytimes, 2013). The individuals who actually run commercial child 
pornography sites - who are often organised criminals (Kierkegaard, 2011) - can use a 
number of tactics to protect their identities. One is to use a Botnet, which is a collection of 
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compromised computers (bots) controlled by a remote command and control infrastructure 
(Elliott, 2010). Individuals running botnets (called ‘botherders’) use a technology called fast 
flux DNS to sell services to individuals who wish to host child abuse content on the 
compromised computers. The child abuse content will be hosted on a certain subset of the 
bots. However, the domain name of the child abuse site will point to a different subset of bots 
in the bot network every minute, making it difficult for law enforcement to trace the exact 
location of the child abuse content and the individuals running the site (Elliott 2010). Some 
offenders advertise  children for sale, for sexual abuse, over the internet, but a proportion are 
subsequently apprehended  in undercover police investigations (Mitchell et al., 2011). How 
these offenders decide which ‘clients’ can be trusted and which cannot is also unknown. 
 
Offenders who wish to contact children over the internet 
Individuals who seek to make contact with children over the internet, or those seeking to 
upload recordings of their own abusive actions, would seem to be taking greater risks than 
individuals who are solely consumers of child abuse material (though we recognize that some 
non-contact offenders are also involved in undetected contact offences and questionable real-
life activities such as travelling to countries known for sex tourism (Bourke & Hernandez, 
2009; Niveau, 2009)). These individuals can attempt to control risk in several ways. These 
offenders may be sufficiently manipulative that they are able to move burgeoning online 
relationships with children offline, aware that online interactions may carry more risks of 
being detected than ‘real-life’ interactions (though some offenders only pursue online 
interactions with children) (Wolak et al., 2008). They may seek to move internet 
communication with the child to a more private communication medium such as email 
(Webster et al., 2012). Offenders often seek to remotely control the child’s physical 
environment, for example by asking the child if the offender will be overheard by the child’s 
parents, or by blackmailing or threatening the child to keep quiet (Kierkergaard, 2011; Olson 
et al., 2007). Before transmitting identifiable information to a child (such as a picture of 
themselves), some offenders also take steps to verify the child’s identity. However, offenders 
risk management strategies can be naieve or foolish. For example, chatroom offenders 
seeking to groom children have been reported asking undercover police officers if they are 
“under cover girls” (Briggs et al., 2011) and social network offenders interested in meeting 
children for sex have been reported looking at the ‘child’s’ Facebook profile, not considering 
that the police could also have generated that profile (Mitchell et al., 2010a).  
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Discussion 
This is the first study to review of what is known about internet sex offenders’ use of identity 
protection techniques and technologies, and the factors that might influence offenders’ 
perceptions of online risk. The review found that offenders use a mixture of new and old 
(relatively speaking) internet technologies to abuse children. Offenders’ perceptions of the 
risks of using these technologies appear to exist along a continuum. Counter-intuitively - 
given the seriousness of the consequences for them if they are detected - many offenders do 
not appear to take steps to protect their identities (Wolak et al. 2011), but a proportion do, 
and these offenders can be quite sophisticated in terms of the counter-measures that they use 
to combat risk.  
 
There are a number of limitations and gaps in the existing research literature that need 
addressing. Research on the factors that influence offenders’ perceptions of online risk is very 
limited (especially research on the perceptions of unsecure offenders), despite the work 
identified in this article. Although no studies have examined  the relationships between 
offenders’ perceptions and their security behaviours (Holt et al., 2010), psychological 
research on health-related risk suggests that there is likely to be a strong correlation here 
(Brewer et al., 2004). This research would suggest that the offenders who have the greatest 
risk-related concerns would be the most likely to employ anti-surveillance measures. This 
makes intuitive sense. However, Brewer et al.s research, and similar work in the health field, 
is interesting as it suggests that once people take actions to combat risk, their concerns about 
risk can subsequently decrease. This implies that some offenders who employ security 
counter-measures may subsequently become less concerned about risk, increasing the 
likelihood that they would make a security mistake that would render them vulnerable to 
detection. Furthermore, just because an offender uses a countersurveillance measure does not 
mean that measure is sufficient for the threat the offender is facing (as demonstrated by 
studies such as Briggs et al., 2011). The use of counter-surveillance technologies may 
therefore give some offenders the illusion of security, rather than true security, and encourage 
them to engage in excessively risky practices.  
 
The fact that so many offenders do not appear to take technological steps to protect their 
identities (Wolak et al., 2011) or freely or inadvertently information about themselves 
(Briggs et al., 2011) is notable, particularly given the catastrophic social and legal 
consequences for them if they are detected (Gallagher, 2007). A number of offenders likely 
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believe that the ‘anonymity’ afforded by the internet is sufficient to protect their identities. 
Other may be careless or impulsive individuals, or believe that the internet is an unreal place 
where their actions have no real-world consequences, and therefore there is no need to protect 
against these consequences (Webster et al., 2012). Interpreted via the concepts of the 
sociologist Erving Goffman, many of these individuals likely see the internet as a ‘back-
region’, a fantasy space where they are free from surveillance. These individuals 
fundamentally misunderstand that the internet is potentially a giant panoptican, a surveillance 
machine. However Wolak et al.s data is seven years old. Since their data was generated, 
concerns about government and corporate surveillance of society have gone mainstream in 
Western nations (Quayle & Taylor, 2011). It is probable that many more people are aware 
now that they are being tracked every time they go online than would have been the case in 
2006. In Goffman’s terms, they are aware that the internet is a ‘front-region’. Sex offenders 
are part of the population like everyone else and it is likely that awareness of surveillance risk 
has increased amongst sex offenders since the mid-2000s. Indeed, recent police reports 
indicate that offenders use of encryption and darknet technologies may have increased 
substantially in the past several years (CEOP, 2012). CEOP estimates that almost half of UK 
hidden internet use now involves paedophile activities.  
 
A number of research and practice implications stem from the findings of this review. There 
is a need: to investigate the factors that offenders use to determine if particular technologies, 
individuals and web-sites can be trusted or not; and to use this research to refine online sting 
operations. We still do not know, for example, how an offender assesses if a particular social 
network profile is actually that of a child’s, and can be safely approached, or a police 
officer’s, and needs to be avoided. To disrupt feelings of perceived anonymity amongst 
unsecure offenders, it could be useful to have messages ‘pop-up’ every time a person enters a 
child abuse specific search term (see Steel, 2009 for a list of these terms) into a search engine 
or P2P platform (Prichard et al., 2011). This message could say that, for example, Google or 
the person’s ISP has recorded the search together with the person’s I.P. address; or put 
warnings up saying that particular torrent or websites are being actively monitored by the 
police and technology companies for child abuse discussions/content.  
 
Conclusion 
Internet sex offenders are heterogeneous in terms of how they assess risk and also in how 
they use technologies such as encryption to protect their identities. For some offenders 
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identity protection is not a priority; for others, however, detection risk is a significant 
problem that they are actively attempting to solve. A major research programme is needed to 
investigate offenders’ use of technology, and in particular their use of identity protection 
technologies. At this point, we have a fairly good understanding of why offenders perpetrate 
CSA ; we now need to know more about how they use technology to facilitate this abuse, 
avoid detection and thwart investigation.  
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